NEW DELHI/KOLKATA: Commission of Railway Safety (CRS), in its provisional findings in the Kanchanjunga Express accident that claimed 10 lives, has pointed to wrong authority letters issued to loco pilots on how to negotiate defective signals and lapses at “multiple levels” in train operations following failure of automatic signals.
In its report to the Railway Board, CRS grimly noted that this was an “accident-in-waiting”, citing how improper authority letters were issued at the zonal level to loco pilots and that too without adequate information.
The report, although provisional, has virtually exonerated the goods train loco pilot Amit Kumar, who was faulted by railway authorities in the immediate wake of the mishap while pointing a finger at ambiguity in rules to be followed in cases of failure of automatic signals, the Rangapani station master and senior authorities in Katihar division.
The loco pilot was among those killed in the accident on June 17 in West Bengal’s Darjeeling district.
The CRS said the ‘paper authority’ issued to loco pilots of trains operating between Rangapani and Chatterhat on that day when automatic signals had failed did not mention the speed limit that drivers were supposed to follow while crossing defective signals. Also, the loco pilot and the train manager were not provided with walkie-talkies which could have ensured better communication.
On the role of the loco pilot of the goods train that collided with Kanchanjungha Express, the report said the authority letter (T/A 912) was given to him to pass all the mentioned defective signals without any caution order. “This created an impression in the mind of the loco pilot that all defective signals can be passed at the maximum permissible speed of the section,” it said.
The maximum speed of the section was 110 kmph. The goods train was moving at 78 kmph and when the loco pilot applied brakes, he couldn’t decelerate below 40 kmph and ended up rear-ending Kanchanjunga Express, which had stopped.
Immediately after the mishap, Railway Board chairperson Jaya Verma Sinha had claimed that Kumar had disregarded signals and this led to the accident.
The report pointed out that on the day of the accident, officials should have treated the signalling failure — reported at 5.50am — as a “major signal failure” and followed the ‘automatic block system (ABS)’. In this system, only one train is allowed to stay between two stations. No other train is supposed to enter the stretch until the preceding one has reached the next station.
In this case, not declaring ABS meant the station master at Rangapani allowed the goods train to enter the section without confirming with the Chatterhat station master whether Kanchanjungha Express had crossed. The Rangapani station master also issued the wrong authority letter (T/A 912, which does not have any speed restrictions, instead of T/B 912, which limits speed to 25kmph) to loco pilots of the two trains involved in the accident, as well as five other trains preceding them.
The railway safety regulator found that besides these two trains, five other trains had entered the section since the signals turned defective on that day, each following different speeds while passing defective signals.
“It is evident that the understanding of loco pilots regarding action to be taken when T/A 912 is issued is not clear to them. Some loco pilots have followed the 15kmph rule while most loco pilots did not follow this rule. The absence of proper authority and that too without adequate information created misinterpretation and misunderstanding about the speed to be followed,” the report said.
It also mentioned that no caution order was issued to the loco pilots by the station master.
As per the findings, only Kanchanjungha Express followed the norm of moving at a maximum speed of 15kmph and stopping for one minute at each defective signal while the remaining six trains, including the goods train, didn’t follow this norm.
The report also flagged that there was “inadequate counselling of loco pilots and station masters” about train operation in automatic signalling territory. It said “ad hocism” was prevalent at the divisional level in issuing the authorities and instructions, and station masters were adopting different procedures.
The CRS said in case of multiple signal failures, there were three options left with the rail administration, but they followed none.
On the role of others, the report said the control office at the divisional level must be manned by one senior section engineer, one junior engineer and one helper round-the-clock in an eight-hour shift. However, on the night of June 16, the signalling control office was manned by a technician.
“It is not possible to manage such a major signalling failure by a staff of technician level. The response of higher officials of the signalling department at the divisional level posted in Katihar has been found lacklustre as despite being informed about this serious failure, none of them went to the control office to manage and coordinate with other departments for timely attention of signalling failures,” it said.
In its report to the Railway Board, CRS grimly noted that this was an “accident-in-waiting”, citing how improper authority letters were issued at the zonal level to loco pilots and that too without adequate information.
The report, although provisional, has virtually exonerated the goods train loco pilot Amit Kumar, who was faulted by railway authorities in the immediate wake of the mishap while pointing a finger at ambiguity in rules to be followed in cases of failure of automatic signals, the Rangapani station master and senior authorities in Katihar division.
The loco pilot was among those killed in the accident on June 17 in West Bengal’s Darjeeling district.
The CRS said the ‘paper authority’ issued to loco pilots of trains operating between Rangapani and Chatterhat on that day when automatic signals had failed did not mention the speed limit that drivers were supposed to follow while crossing defective signals. Also, the loco pilot and the train manager were not provided with walkie-talkies which could have ensured better communication.
On the role of the loco pilot of the goods train that collided with Kanchanjungha Express, the report said the authority letter (T/A 912) was given to him to pass all the mentioned defective signals without any caution order. “This created an impression in the mind of the loco pilot that all defective signals can be passed at the maximum permissible speed of the section,” it said.
The maximum speed of the section was 110 kmph. The goods train was moving at 78 kmph and when the loco pilot applied brakes, he couldn’t decelerate below 40 kmph and ended up rear-ending Kanchanjunga Express, which had stopped.
Immediately after the mishap, Railway Board chairperson Jaya Verma Sinha had claimed that Kumar had disregarded signals and this led to the accident.
The report pointed out that on the day of the accident, officials should have treated the signalling failure — reported at 5.50am — as a “major signal failure” and followed the ‘automatic block system (ABS)’. In this system, only one train is allowed to stay between two stations. No other train is supposed to enter the stretch until the preceding one has reached the next station.
In this case, not declaring ABS meant the station master at Rangapani allowed the goods train to enter the section without confirming with the Chatterhat station master whether Kanchanjungha Express had crossed. The Rangapani station master also issued the wrong authority letter (T/A 912, which does not have any speed restrictions, instead of T/B 912, which limits speed to 25kmph) to loco pilots of the two trains involved in the accident, as well as five other trains preceding them.
The railway safety regulator found that besides these two trains, five other trains had entered the section since the signals turned defective on that day, each following different speeds while passing defective signals.
“It is evident that the understanding of loco pilots regarding action to be taken when T/A 912 is issued is not clear to them. Some loco pilots have followed the 15kmph rule while most loco pilots did not follow this rule. The absence of proper authority and that too without adequate information created misinterpretation and misunderstanding about the speed to be followed,” the report said.
It also mentioned that no caution order was issued to the loco pilots by the station master.
As per the findings, only Kanchanjungha Express followed the norm of moving at a maximum speed of 15kmph and stopping for one minute at each defective signal while the remaining six trains, including the goods train, didn’t follow this norm.
The report also flagged that there was “inadequate counselling of loco pilots and station masters” about train operation in automatic signalling territory. It said “ad hocism” was prevalent at the divisional level in issuing the authorities and instructions, and station masters were adopting different procedures.
The CRS said in case of multiple signal failures, there were three options left with the rail administration, but they followed none.
On the role of others, the report said the control office at the divisional level must be manned by one senior section engineer, one junior engineer and one helper round-the-clock in an eight-hour shift. However, on the night of June 16, the signalling control office was manned by a technician.
“It is not possible to manage such a major signalling failure by a staff of technician level. The response of higher officials of the signalling department at the divisional level posted in Katihar has been found lacklustre as despite being informed about this serious failure, none of them went to the control office to manage and coordinate with other departments for timely attention of signalling failures,” it said.